代理冲突、财务信息披露质量与过度投资的实证检验

doi:10.16716/j.cnki.65-1030/f.2016.04.003

新疆财经 ›› 2016,Issue (4): 27-36.doi: 10.16716/j.cnki.65-1030/f.2016.04.003

代理冲突、财务信息披露质量与过度投资的实证检验

姚曦^1,2

1.新疆财经大学会计学院/企业发展研究中心,新疆乌鲁木齐 830012;
2.石河子大学公司治理与管理创新研究中心,新疆石河子市 832000

收稿日期:2016-05-10 出版日期:2016-08-25 发布日期:2020-12-01
作者简介:姚曦(1976-),女,副教授,博士,新疆财经大学企业发展研究中心研究员,石河子大学公司治理与管理创新研究中心研究员,研究方向:公司财务与公司治理、企业内部控制与审计。
基金资助:
教育部人文社会科学研究项目“制度背景、管理者权力与公司投资效率研究”(14XJJC630002);新疆维吾尔自治区普通高校人文社会科学重点研究基地项目“管理层权力与公司投资行为”(XJEDU020213C03)

An Empirical Test of Agency Conflicts, Financial Information Disclosure Quality and Over-investment

Yao Xi^1,2

1. Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics, Urumqi 830012, China;
2. Corporate Governance and Management Innovation Research Center, Shihezi 832000, China

Received:2016-05-10 Online:2016-08-25 Published:2020-12-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以2009年—2014年间的非金融上市公司为样本,将财务信息披露质量、代理冲突与过度投资纳入同一研究框架进行实证研究。结果发现:公司的股东与经营者之间以及公司的控股股东与中小股东之间的两类委托代理问题均会造成企业的过度投资;而财务信息披露质量对代理问题具有抑制作用,即随着财务信息披露质量的提高,公司的代理成本将会下降;财务信息披露质量的提高能降低代理成本对过度投资的影响。

关键词: 财务信息披露质量, 代理冲突, 过度投资

Abstract: Using non financial listed companies from 2009 to 2014 as the samples, this paper brings the financial information disclosure quality, agency conflicts and over-investment into one framework to make an empirical study. The results show that both the agency problem between shareholders and management and that between controlling and minority shareholders will lead to over-investment of the enterprises. The financial information disclosure quality will restrain the agency problem, that is, with the improvement in the quality of financial information disclosure, the agency cost will be reduced, which will reduce the influence of agency cost on over-investment.

Key words: Financial Information Disclosure Quality, Agency conflicts, Over-investment

中图分类号:

F275

姚曦. 代理冲突、财务信息披露质量与过度投资的实证检验[J]. 新疆财经, 2016, (4): 27-36.

Yao Xi. An Empirical Test of Agency Conflicts, Financial Information Disclosure Quality and Over-investment[J]. Finance & Economics of Xinjiang, 2016, (4): 27-36.

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代理冲突、财务信息披露质量与过度投资的实证检验

An Empirical Test of Agency Conflicts, Financial Information Disclosure Quality and Over-investment

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