新疆财经 ›› 2020,Issue (6): 25-34.doi: 10.16716/j.cnki.65-1030/f.2020.06.003

• 管理纵横 • 上一篇    下一篇

我国税收征管激励约束机制完善研究——基于动态博弈视阈的分析

邓晓兰1, 王静1,2   

  1. 1.西安交通大学 经济与金融学院, 陕西 西安 710049;
    2.西安财经大学 经济学院,陕西 西安 710100
  • 收稿日期:2020-07-22 出版日期:2020-12-25 发布日期:2021-02-07
  • 作者简介:邓晓兰(1958—),女,教授,经济学博士,研究方向为财税政策与公债管理;王静(1979—),女,讲师,博士研究生,研究方向为财税理论与实务。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目“减税降费与财政可持续性研究”(19XJY020); 陕西省第二批“三秦学者”岗位专项资助项目

On Perfection of Incentive and Restraint Mechanism of Tax Collection and Management in China—An Analysis from the Perspective of Dynamic Game

Deng Xiaolan1, Wang Jing1, 2   

  1. 1. Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710049,China;
    2. Xi'an University of Finance and Economics,Xi'an 710100,China
  • Received:2020-07-22 Online:2020-12-25 Published:2021-02-07

摘要: 保证国家税款应收尽收是任何时期税收征管工作的主旨。减税降费政策实施以来,财政收入大幅减少,更加凸显了加强税收征管、保证国家税款应收尽收的迫切性。税收征管重在制度建设,特别是对于税收征管激励约束机制的设计和完善。本文通过构建三主体、两阶段完全但不完美信息动态博弈模型,分析了目前我国税收征管激励约束机制的特点和作用机理,厘清现实中税务官员工作懈怠、纳税人税收不遵从、征纳双方合谋等现象存在的理论根源。在此基础上引入对税务官员的税收奖惩变量,基于完全动态博弈分析找到税务官员严格依法征税的激励约束条件。提出应完善对纳税人的处罚规定、增设对税务官员的处罚规定、设计税收征管的奖励制度等对策建议,以期为完善我国税收征管激励约束机制提供参考。

关键词: 税收征管激励约束机制, 税收处罚, 税收奖励, 税收征纳博弈关系, 税收征管效率

Abstract: To ensure the full collection of national tax is the main purpose of tax collection and management in any period. In particular, tax reduction and fee reduction lead to large-scale revenue reduction, which highlights the urgency of strengthening tax collection and management to ensure full revenue collection. Tax Collection and management focuses on system construction, especially on the improvement of the incentive and restraint mechanism. By constructing a dynamic game model of principal-agent with three subjects and two stages of complete but imperfect information, this paper analyzes the characteristics and mechanism of China's current incentive and restraint mechanism, and clarifies the theoretical roots of the phenomena such as slack work of tax officials, non-compliance of tax payers and collusion between tax payers and tax collectors in reality. On the basis of the introduction of tax of tax officials rewards and punishments variables and the modification of the original model, the paper finds incentives and constraints for tax officials to collect tax and enforce the law strictly based on the complete dynamic game analysis, and proposes such countermeasures as improving punishment regulations for taxpayers, enacting punishment regulations for tax officials, and designing an incentive system for tax collection and management to provide reference for perfecting the incentive and restraint mechanism of tax collection and management in china.

Key words: Incentive and Restraint Mechanism of Tax Collection and Management, Tax Punishments, Tax Incentives, the Game Relation of Tax Collection and Payment, Efficiency of Tax Collection and Administration

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