Abstract: To ensure the full collection of national tax is the main purpose of tax collection and management in any period. In particular, tax reduction and fee reduction lead to large-scale revenue reduction, which highlights the urgency of strengthening tax collection and management to ensure full revenue collection. Tax Collection and management focuses on system construction, especially on the improvement of the incentive and restraint mechanism. By constructing a dynamic game model of principal-agent with three subjects and two stages of complete but imperfect information, this paper analyzes the characteristics and mechanism of China's current incentive and restraint mechanism, and clarifies the theoretical roots of the phenomena such as slack work of tax officials, non-compliance of tax payers and collusion between tax payers and tax collectors in reality. On the basis of the introduction of tax of tax officials rewards and punishments variables and the modification of the original model, the paper finds incentives and constraints for tax officials to collect tax and enforce the law strictly based on the complete dynamic game analysis, and proposes such countermeasures as improving punishment regulations for taxpayers, enacting punishment regulations for tax officials, and designing an incentive system for tax collection and management to provide reference for perfecting the incentive and restraint mechanism of tax collection and management in china.

Key words: Incentive and Restraint Mechanism of Tax Collection and Management, Tax Punishments, Tax Incentives, the Game Relation of Tax Collection and Payment, Efficiency of Tax Collection and Administration