A Dynamic Evolutionary Game Analysis of the “Herd Behavior”of Fund Managers in China’s Securities Market

  • Wang Jun ,
  • Wu Yuqian ,
  • Huang Huaji
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  • Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Anhui Bengbu 233000,China

Received date: 2018-04-25

  Online published: 2020-11-27

Abstract

Herding capital market presence will cause excessive concentration of funds,which not only will make it lose the original financing function,but will lncrease market volatility risks.From the perspective of behavioral finance,this paper establishes a dynamic evolutionary game for the fund manager’s market herd behavior.According to the analysis,when the cost of information snooping in the industry is low,managers who make investment decisions and act first will obtain greater benefits when they spend relatively high costs to obtain relevant information.The trail manager only needs to observe the former's signal and choose to follow to get the maximum benefit.The conclusion is in line with market facts but it is not conducive to the stable development of the market.Therefore,based on the model results,in order to avoid the obvious existence of herd behaviors in the market for the analysis of the fund industry,the paper provides corresponding suggestions for the healthy development of the fund industry in the future industry governance recommendations.

Cite this article

Wang Jun , Wu Yuqian , Huang Huaji . A Dynamic Evolutionary Game Analysis of the “Herd Behavior”of Fund Managers in China’s Securities Market[J]. Finance & Economics of Xinjiang, 2018 , 0(4) : 11 -20 . DOI: 10.16716/j.cnki.65-1030/f.2018.04.002

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