The paper takes A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2021 as research samples to empirically test the relationship between non-CEO executive independence and stock price collapse risk, and explores its impact mechanism from the perspective of information transparency. The study has found that there is a significant negative correlation between the independence of non-CEO executives and the risk of stock price collapse, indicating that the internal governance effect played by non-CEO executives with independence suppresses the risk of stock price collapse. The impact mechanism test results show that non-CEO executives with independence can suppress the risk of stock price collapse by improving corporate information transparency. The results of heterogeneity analysis indicate that the negative correlation between the independence of non-CEO executives and the risk of stock price collapse is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises with weak external supervision and low regional marketization. In this regard, enterprises should fully value and ensure the independence of the executive team, and the government should continuously improve the information disclosure system to ensure the sustained and healthy development of the capital market and the stability of the national financial order.