Finance & Economics of Xinjiang

Finance & Economics of Xinjiang >

2024 , Vol. 0 >Issue 3: 55 - 67

DOI: https://doi.org/10.16716/j.cnki.65-1030/f.2024.03.006

How does the Performance Appraisal System Affectthe Budget Slack of Central Enterprises—Evidence from a Quasi Natural Experiments

  • NIU Biao ,
  • WANG Tao ,
  • JING Mingyu
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  • 1. China Academy of Financial Sciences, Beijing 100142, China
    2. Strategic Planning Department of China Life Insurance Co., Ltd, Beijing 100033, China

Received date: 2023-11-27

  Online published: 2024-09-12

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Abstract

Budget slack is one of the important combination points of enterprise budget management and performance evaluation. Based on the agency theory and contingency theory, this paper examines the impact of performance appraisal systems on the budget slack of central enterprises using the DID (Difference-in-Differences) model. The results show that the performance appraisal system significantly reduces the degree of budget slack and budget execution deviation in central enterprises by reducing the first type of agency costs, and this effect is more pronounced in enterprises with low levels of internal control; the lower budget slack and budget execution deviation caused by the performance appraisal system can enhance the enterprise value of central enterprises. In the future, regulators should further improve the performance appraisal system and improve the governance efficiency, and at the same time, differentiated regulatory measures should be adopted to promote the improvement of the internal control system of enterprises, so as to provide a strong mechanism guarantee for the full play of the governance efficiency of the performance appraisal system.

Key words： performance appraisal; budget slack; central enterprises; agency costs; governance effect

Cite this article

NIU Biao , WANG Tao , JING Mingyu . How does the Performance Appraisal System Affectthe Budget Slack of Central Enterprises—Evidence from a Quasi Natural Experiments[J]. Finance & Economics of Xinjiang, 2024 , 0(3) : 55 -67 . DOI: 10.16716/j.cnki.65-1030/f.2024.03.006

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