Impact of Internal Compensation Gaps among Senior Executives on High-Quality Corporate Development: An Empirical Analysis Based on Chinese A-Share Listed Companies

  • XU Jianling ,
  • LIU Siyi ,
  • ZHANG Ankang
Expand
  • 1 Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210023, China
    2 State Grid Anhui Electric Power Co., Ltd. Zongyang County Power Supply Company, Tongling 246700, China

Received date: 2025-09-07

  Online published: 2026-09-08

Abstract

This study selects data from China's A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges between 2010 and 2023 to examine the impact of internal executive pay disparities on high-quality enterprise development. The findings indicate that widening internal executive compensation gaps significantly promote high-quality development, with enhanced corporate competitiveness serving as a key mechanism. However, the gap between executives and employees, as well as customer concentration, exerts a certain negative moderating effect. Moreover, the promoting effect of internal executive pay gaps on high-quality corporate development is more pronounced in firms with lower marketization levels, without CEO-chairman duality, and facing intense product market competition. Going forward, enterprises could adopt differentiated compensation systems, reasonably widen internal executive pay gaps, balance salary allocations between management and employees, and optimize their customer structure to reduce reliance risks, thereby better advancing high-quality development.

Cite this article

XU Jianling , LIU Siyi , ZHANG Ankang . Impact of Internal Compensation Gaps among Senior Executives on High-Quality Corporate Development: An Empirical Analysis Based on Chinese A-Share Listed Companies[J]. Finance & Economics of Xinjiang, 2026 , 0(3) : 70 -80 . DOI: 10.16716/j.cnki.65-1030/f.2026.03.007

References

[1] HAMBRICK D C, MASON P A. Upper echelons:the organization as a reflection of its top managers[J]. The academy of management review, 1984(2):193-206.
[2] 盛明泉, 张娅楠, 蒋世战. 高管薪酬差距与企业全要素生产率[J]. 河北经贸大学学报, 2019(2):81-89.
[3] 姜浩, 吾买尔江·艾山, 邓峰. 高管团队薪酬差距、投资效率与企业全要素生产率[J]. 技术经济与管理研究, 2023(6):49-54.
[4] 黄永春, 晁一方, 彭荣. 高管团队薪酬差距、企业战略变革与突破性创新:内部控制的调节作用[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理, 2022(5):161-177.
[5] 杨伽伦, 朱玉杰. 薪酬管制、企业内部薪酬差距与创新:来自制造业的证据[J]. 经济学报, 2020(4):122-155.
[6] KIM J, KOO K. The dark side of tournaments:evidence from innovation performance[J]. Research in international business and finance, 2023, 66:102003.
[7] 韩丰泽, 戴金平. 金融科技与对外直接投资:基于企业金融化与生产率视角的研究[J]. 国际经贸探索, 2022(4):68-86.
[8] 许志勇, 韩炳, 彭芸, 等. 企业金融化、技术创新与企业高质量发展[J]. 科研管理, 2023(6):74-84.
[9] 顾海峰, 朱慧萍. 高管薪酬差距促进了企业创新投资吗:基于中国A股上市公司的证据[J]. 会计研究, 2021(12):107-120.
[10] 庄旭东, 段军山. 中国医药制造企业技术创新投入与竞争力水平:承担社会责任是“纾困保险”还是“成本负担”?[J]. 现代经济探讨, 2023(7):102-114.
[11] 柳光强, 孔高文. 高管经管教育背景与企业内部薪酬差距[J]. 会计研究, 2021(3):110-121.
[12] 刘运国, 郑明晖, 徐悦. 客户集中度与高管薪酬粘性:基于风险承担视角[J]. 会计与经济研究, 2024(1):3-22.
[13] 温忠麟, 张雷, 侯杰泰, 等. 中介效应检验程序及其应用[J]. 心理学报, 2004(5):614-620.
[14] 范宇, 林子豪. 高管薪酬差距缩减对企业创新的促进作用:基于管理层短视的机制分析[J]. 科技管理研究, 2025(10):146-153.
[15] 李丹蒙, 叶建芳, 张培莉. 客户集中度、CEO背景特征与企业费用粘性[J]. 南方经济, 2020(3):105-118.
[16] 王玉龙, 李佩茹, 鄢翔. 客户集中度能影响企业劳动收入份额吗[J]. 会计研究, 2022(10):99-114.
[17] 王丹, 李丹, 李欢. 客户集中度与企业投资效率[J]. 会计研究, 2020(1):110-125.
[18] 樊纲, 王小鲁, 马光荣. 中国市场化进程对经济增长的贡献[J]. 经济研究, 2011(9):4-16.
Outlines

/

〈 〉