Abstract: By constructing a tripartite cooperation evolutionary game model of enterprises, venture capital institutions and commercial banks in the investment-loan linkage model, this paper analyzes the form of the optimal solution and the determinants that affect the optimal strategies of all parties. It has found that firstly, if the financing cost of an enterprise falls or the cost of withdrawing financing rises, the enterprise tends to participate in financing, and compared with the financial cost, the enterprise's expectation has a greater influence on the game decision-making. Secondly, when the enterprise control right is adjusted moderately with the distribution structure of enterprise innovation income, it is beneficial to the tripartite cooperation. However, the excessive transfer of control right will inhibit the cooperation. Thirdly, Government subsidy is conducive to strengthening banks' participation in financing cooperation, and moderate punishment by the government for banks that do not participate in financing is conducive to improving Banks' prudence, but excessive punishment will inhibit the formation of optimal solutions.

Key words: Investment-loan Linkage Mode, Enterprise Financing, Venture Capital Institutions, Credit, Transfer of Control, Government Incentives, Evolutionary Games