Banking Connection,Regional Financial Development and Executive Compensation

doi:10.16716/j.cnki.65-1030/f.2021.02.003

Abstract

Abstract: By using A-share listed enterprises during 2012-2019 in China, this paper empirically studies relationship between banking connection and executive compensation. The study has found that banking connection could improve the level of executive compensation, and it is more significant in higher-hierarchy banking connected enterprises. It also finds that the level of regional financial development will affect the role of banking connection in executive compensation pricing. Executive compensation will be improved more significantly after building higher-hierarchy banking connection in areas of lower financial development level. Further research its mechanism, the paper finds that alleviating financing constraints has a significant indirect effect on improving executive compensation. This paper explores the factors influencing executive compensation from the perspective of informal institution of bank association, which provides empirical evidence for the design of executive compensation contracts.

Key words: Compensation, Banking Connection, Connective Hierarchy, Financial Development, Financing Constraints, Compensation Contract

CLC Number:

Chen Jiping, Cui Haojie, Wang Shuai. Banking Connection,Regional Financial Development and Executive Compensation[J]. Finance & Economics of Xinjiang, 2021, (2): 29-39.

References

[1] Allen F,Qian J,Qian M.Law,Finance and Economic Growth in China[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005(1):57-116.
[2] 唐建新,卢剑龙,余明桂.银行关系、政治联系与民营企业贷款:来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].经济评论,2011(3):51-58.
[3] 邓建平,曾勇.金融生态环境、银行关联与债务融资——基于我国民营企业的实证研究[J].会计研究,2011 (12):33-40.
[4] Burak A G,Malmendier U,Tate G.Financial Expertise of Directors[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008(2):323-354.
[5] Ciamarra E S.Monitoring by Affiliated Bankers on Board of Directors:Evidence from Corporate Financing Outcomes[J].Financial Management,2012(3):1-38.
[6] 顾海峰,刘子栋.高管薪酬激励、银行关联与企业资本结构偏离——来自A股上市公司的证据[J].证券市场导报,2020(8):40-50.
[7] 宇文晶,王振山,崔文芳.银行关联、融资约束与企业现金—现金流敏感[J].山西财经大学学报,2017(7):29-43.
[8] Jensen M C,Murphy K J.Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990 (2):225-264.
[9] 董丽萍,张军.管理层薪酬激励与盈余管理关系:基于大股东治理视角[J].中国流通经济,2018(12):73-86.
[10] 蔡贵龙,柳建华,马新啸.非国有股东治理与国企高管薪酬激励[J].管理世界,2018(5):137-149.
[11] 史小坤,陶雨琴,贾丹丹.内部董事声誉、制度环境与上市企业银行贷款——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].金融与经济,2019(3):39-46.
[12] 刘浩,唐松,楼俊.独立董事:监督还是咨询?——银行背景独立董事对企业信贷融资影响研究[J].管理世界,2012(1):141-156+169.
[13] 祝继高,韩非池,陆正飞.产业政策、银行关联与企业债务融资——基于A股上市公司的实证研究[J].金融研究,2015(3):176-191.
[14] 朱滔,杨子尧.国有上市公司为何要建立银行关联:缓解融资还是强化监督?[J].财务研究,2017(6):16-26.
[15] 翟胜宝,许浩然,唐玮,等.银行关联与企业创新——基于我国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2018(7):50-56.
[16] 李成友,孙涛,焦勇.要素禀赋、工资差距与人力资本形成[J].经济研究,2018(10):113-126.
[17] 姜付秀,朱冰,王运通.国有企业的经理激励契约更不看重绩效吗?[J].管理世界,2014(9):143-159.
[18] 纪宇,王彦超.高管薪酬水平的影响因素——述评与展望[J].中央财经大学学报,2019(7):54-63.
[19] 邓建平,陈爱华,饶妙.金融关联与高管薪酬业绩敏感性[J].财贸研究,2018(10):98-110.
[20] 卜盐芳.领导团队薪酬差异及其激励效应探究——基于管理层权力理论[J].领导科学,2018(5):47-49.
[21] 王小鲁,樊纲,胡李鹏.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2018)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2019.
[22] 王国刚,冯光华.中国地区金融生态环境评价(2013—2014)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2015.
[23] 郭丽虹,王硕.融资缺口、市场化程度与中小企业信贷可得性——基于非上市制造业企业面板数据的分析[J].财经研究,2013(12):115-125.
[24] 曹越,胡新玉,刘文溪,等.媒体报道、市场化进程与高管薪酬[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2016(3):97-105.
[25] 张翼,黄伟刚,郑兴无.中小企业集聚、金融发展与区域创新能力[J].金融与经济,2019(8):28-34.
[26] 方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗[J].经济研究,2009(3):110-124.
[27] 万媛媛,井润田,刘玉焕.中美两国上市公司高管薪酬决定因素比较研究[J].管理科学学报,2008(4):100- 110+152.
[28] 李姝,谢晓嫣.民营企业的社会责任、政治关联与债务融资——来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2014(6):30-40+95.
[29] John K,Litov L,Yeung B.Corporate Governance and Risk Taking[J].Journal of Finance,2008(4):1679-1728.
[30] 石璋铭,谢存旭.银行竞争、融资约束与战略性新兴产业技术创新[J].宏观经济研究,2015(8):117-126.
[31] 权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[32] 谢盛纹,廖佳,陶然.年报预约披露推迟、金融生态环境与债务融资成本——基于信息风险识别和风险补偿转化视角[J].管理评论,2018(12):200-211.