Will the risk of adding the "*ST" mark to stocks of enterprises again after they removing it be significantly weakened with the continuous improvement of the delisting system reform? It is crucial to investigate this theory to evaluate the effectiveness of delisting system reform. With intention of evaluating the effectiveness of the delisting system reform, this paper tests the risk of adding the "*ST" mark to stocks of enterprises again after they removing it and the dynamic change of risk with the delisting reform by means of the survival model. The results show that: (1) Although from the perspective of annual evolution, the risk of adding the "*ST" mark to stocks of enterprises again after they removing it has shown a certain growth trend, with the continuous promotion of the delisting reform, such risk has significantly decreased, which means that the stability of performance of decapitated enterprises has significantly improved; (2) in terms of heterogeneity, the longer an enterprise has experienced the special treatment, the lower its risk of adding the "*ST" mark to its stock again, and enterprises with regulatory inquiry experience has lower likelihood of adding the "*ST" mark to their stocks again; (3) as the delisting reform has tightened the conditions for removing special treatment, the influence of special treatment processing time and regulatory inquiry on the risk of adding the "*ST" mark to stocks of enterprises again has weakened, and the reform has a certain substitute significance for risk improvement; (4) it is further proved from the perspective of financial violation that the financial violation punishment experience of enterprises after removing the "*ST" mark will increase the risk of adding the "*ST" mark to their stocks again but with the promotion of delisting reform, such risk is gradually reducing, which means that the reform plays a positive role in mitigating the performance risk under the impact of punishment.