Tax Collection and Management, Tax Preference and Enterprise Financial Distress Risk

  • LI Guanglong ,
  • XIAO Jigang
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  • Anhui University, Hefei 230039, China

Received date: 2022-08-10

  Online published: 2022-11-24

Abstract

In order to study the influence of strengthening tax enforcement on enterprise financial distress, this paper takes the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2018 as samples and makes an empirical analysis by using difference-in-differences (DID) model, with the implementation of "Golden Tax phase III" as the standard natural experiment. The results show that strengthening tax enforcement enhances the risk of financial distress of enterprises. The influence mechanism shows that strengthening tax enforcement has two different effects. One is to reduce the risk of financial distress by restraining excessive investment and reducing agency cost to exert governance effect. The other is to increase the risk of financial distress by increasing corporate tax burden and reducing corporate performance to produce cost effect. However, on the whole, the cost effect formed by tax enforcement has a greater impact on enterprises, and ultimately leads to the increase of the risk of financial distress of enterprises. Therefore, while deepening tax collection and management system reform, China should also vigorously implement tax reduction measures to promote the healthy and sustainable development of enterprises.

Cite this article

LI Guanglong , XIAO Jigang . Tax Collection and Management, Tax Preference and Enterprise Financial Distress Risk[J]. Finance & Economics of Xinjiang, 2022 , 0(5) : 47 -56 . DOI: 10.16716/j.cnki.65-1030/f.2022.05.007

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