新疆财经

新疆财经 ›› 2020,Issue (4): 32-44.doi: 10.16716/j.cnki.65-1030/f.2020.04.004

• 管理纵横 • 上一篇    下一篇

投贷联动业务的演化博弈分析——基于融资方成本收益、投资方控制权转移与政府激励视角

于博, 赵万春   

  1. 天津财经大学 金融学院,天津 300021
  • 收稿日期:2020-05-18 出版日期:2020-08-25 发布日期:2020-10-26
  • 通讯作者: 赵万春(1999 -),男,天津财经大学金融学院公司金融与资本市场研究中心研究人员,研究方向为公司金融与资本市场。
  • 作者简介:于博( 1979- -),男,副教授,经济学博士,研究方向为公司金融与资本市场。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金- -般項目“货币政策波动与企业投资结构再平衡研究( 17BGL062); 天津市高校“中青年骨干创新人才培养计划(津教人函2020[4]号)"资助项目

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Investment-loan Linkage Business–From the Perspective of Tradeoff of Cost and Benefit of Financing Firms, Transfer of Ownership and Government Incentives

Yu Bo, Zhao Wanchun   

  1. Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300022,China
  • Received:2020-05-18 Online:2020-08-25 Published:2020-10-26

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摘要： 本文通过构建投贷联动模式中企业、风投机构与商业银行三方演化合作博弈模型,分析了最优解的形式以及影响各方最优策略的决定因素。研究发现：第一,若企业融资成本下降或企业退出融资的成本上升,则企业倾向参与融资,且与财务成本相比,企业预期对博弈决策的影响更大;第二,当企业控制权随企业创新收益的分配结构适度调整时,有利于三方合作的达成,但控制权过度转移则会抑制合作的达成;第三,政府补贴有利于强化银行参与融资合作,政府对不参与融资的银行进行适度惩罚有利于提高银行的审慎性,但过度惩罚会抑制最优解的形成。

关键词: 投贷联动模式, 企业融资, 风投机构, 信贷投放, 控制权转移, 政府激励, 演化博弈

Abstract: By constructing a tripartite cooperation evolutionary game model of enterprises, venture capital institutions and commercial banks in the investment-loan linkage model, this paper analyzes the form of the optimal solution and the determinants that affect the optimal strategies of all parties. It has found that firstly, if the financing cost of an enterprise falls or the cost of withdrawing financing rises, the enterprise tends to participate in financing, and compared with the financial cost, the enterprise's expectation has a greater influence on the game decision-making. Secondly, when the enterprise control right is adjusted moderately with the distribution structure of enterprise innovation income, it is beneficial to the tripartite cooperation. However, the excessive transfer of control right will inhibit the cooperation. Thirdly, Government subsidy is conducive to strengthening banks' participation in financing cooperation, and moderate punishment by the government for banks that do not participate in financing is conducive to improving Banks' prudence, but excessive punishment will inhibit the formation of optimal solutions.

Key words: Investment-loan Linkage Mode, Enterprise Financing, Venture Capital Institutions, Credit, Transfer of Control, Government Incentives, Evolutionary Games

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