关键词: 央地两级政府, 矿产资源开采, 政府监管, 机会成本, 演化博弈, 均衡策略

Abstract: In the process of mineral resources development, the regulatory relationship between the central and local governments has always been the focus of social attention. Through the establishment of evolutionary game model and analysis of dynamic game model, it is found between the central and local government behavior evolution characteristics and the key factor reaches a stable equilibrium state. The optimal stability strategy of the evolutionary game model is obtained through numerical simulation analysis with Matlab. The research results show that the epicenter in the two levels of government regulation strategy can achieve stable equilibrium depends on both in the process of game of net profit, cost of cost, supervision of the central government and the local government in the process of game lost opportunity cost, at the same time game both sides of the initial state of stable equilibrium state also has certain influence; Central to two levels of government in the process of game to take the best strategy for {negative supervision, actively perform}. Finally, some effective policy suggestions are put forward for the central and local governments to supervise mineral resources.

Key words: Two-level Government, Mining of Mineral Resources, Government Supervision, Opportunity Cost, Evolutionary Game, Equilibrium Strategy