An Empirical Test of Agency Conflicts, Financial Information  Disclosure Quality and Over-investment

doi:10.16716/j.cnki.65-1030/f.2016.04.003

Abstract

Abstract: Using non financial listed companies from 2009 to 2014 as the samples, this paper brings the financial information disclosure quality, agency conflicts and over-investment into one framework to make an empirical study. The results show that both the agency problem between shareholders and management and that between controlling and minority shareholders will lead to over-investment of the enterprises. The financial information disclosure quality will restrain the agency problem, that is, with the improvement in the quality of financial information disclosure, the agency cost will be reduced, which will reduce the influence of agency cost on over-investment.

Key words: Financial Information Disclosure Quality, Agency conflicts, Over-investment

CLC Number:

F275

Yao Xi. An Empirical Test of Agency Conflicts, Financial Information Disclosure Quality and Over-investment[J]. Finance & Economics of Xinjiang, 2016, (4): 27-36.

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An Empirical Test of Agency Conflicts, Financial Information Disclosure Quality and Over-investment

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