Abstract:

An objective reality of China's audit institutions is that the domain of punishment and handling is smaller than that of investigation. Based on the classical audit theory, this paper analyzes the reasons and consequences of the differences between the audit authority's domains of punishment and handling and investigation, and on this basis, analyzes the ways to bridge these differences. The current audit laws and regulations stipulate that the domain of punishment and handling by audit authorities is smaller than that of investigation. The main reasons for this domain discrepancy are that specialized economic regulatory departments did not consider the audit authorities as the main enforcing bodies when proposing their own departmental legislation drafts, and there are different interpretations of "the scope of statutory authority" among relevant personnel in reality. This domain discrepancy severely affects the efficiency of handling and punishing issues found by audits. The path to bridging this domain discrepancy is to extend the domain of punishment and handling to the domain of investigation. Although this will lead to dual supervision of economic activities, since professional economic regulation and audit supervision are of different natures, there are differences in supervision purposes, focuses, and methods between the two, thus avoiding redundant supervision.

Key words: audit power, audit investigation domain, audit punishment and handling domain, administrative authority supervision, ownership supervision