Abstract: By constructing a tripartite cooperation evolutionary game model of enterprises, venture capital institutions and commercial banks in the investment-loan linkage model, this paper analyzes the form of the optimal solution and the determinants that affect the optimal strategies of all parties. It has found that firstly, if the financing cost of an enterprise falls or the cost of withdrawing financing rises, the enterprise tends to participate in financing, and compared with the financial cost, the enterprise's expectation has a greater influence on the game decision-making. Secondly, when the enterprise control right is adjusted moderately with the distribution structure of enterprise innovation income, it is beneficial to the tripartite cooperation. However, the excessive transfer of control right will inhibit the cooperation. Thirdly, Government subsidy is conducive to strengthening banks' participation in financing cooperation, and moderate punishment by the government for banks that do not participate in financing is conducive to improving Banks' prudence, but excessive punishment will inhibit the formation of optimal solutions.

Key words: Investment-loan Linkage Mode, Enterprise Financing, Venture Capital Institutions, Credit, Transfer of Control, Government Incentives, Evolutionary Games

摘要： 本文通过构建投贷联动模式中企业、风投机构与商业银行三方演化合作博弈模型,分析了最优解的形式以及影响各方最优策略的决定因素。研究发现：第一,若企业融资成本下降或企业退出融资的成本上升,则企业倾向参与融资,且与财务成本相比,企业预期对博弈决策的影响更大;第二,当企业控制权随企业创新收益的分配结构适度调整时,有利于三方合作的达成,但控制权过度转移则会抑制合作的达成;第三,政府补贴有利于强化银行参与融资合作,政府对不参与融资的银行进行适度惩罚有利于提高银行的审慎性,但过度惩罚会抑制最优解的形成。

关键词: 投贷联动模式, 企业融资, 风投机构, 信贷投放, 控制权转移, 政府激励, 演化博弈