Abstract:

The governance of corporate leverage manipulation helps prevent financial risks, maintain capital market stability, and improve resource allocation efficiency, thereby providing institutional support for the high-quality development of the real economy. Based on data of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2024, this paper systematically examines how institutional investors' site visits affect corporate leverage manipulation. The results show that institutional investors' site visits can significantly curb corporate leverage manipulation. In terms of the underlying mechanisms, enhancing firms' financing capacity and mitigating information asymmetry are two key channels through which site visits restrain leverage manipulation. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that the inhibitory effect is primarily concentrated among firms with weaker internal controls, those audited by non-Big Four accounting firms, and enterprises located in the eastern region.Going forward, measures such as improving investor relations management, enhancing disclosure systems for research activities, encouraging professional and long-term institutional investors to conduct high-quality research, and implementing differentiated regulation can further suppress corporate leverage manipulation.

Key words: institutional investors' site visits, leverage manipulation, information asymmetry, financing constraints

摘要：

强化对企业杠杆操纵行为的治理与约束，有助于防范金融风险、维护资本市场稳定、提高资源配置效率，从而为实体经济高质量发展提供制度保障。文章基于2012—2024年我国沪深A股上市公司相关数据，系统考察机构投资者实地调研对企业杠杆操纵行为的影响。研究表明，机构投资者实地调研能够显著抑制企业杠杆操纵行为，而降低信息不对称与提高企业融资能力则是产生这一抑制效应的重要作用渠道。异质性分析结果显示，抑制效应主要表现于内部控制质量较差企业、非“四大”会计师事务所审计企业及东部地区企业样本中。今后，可通过规范调研纪要披露，鼓励专业性、长期性机构投资者积极开展高质量调研，实施差异化监管策略等举措，进一步抑制企业杠杆操纵行为。

关键词: 机构投资者实地调研, 杠杆操纵, 信息不对称, 融资约束